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INTRODUCTION

Debates about morality take many different forms, and occur
on several levels. On the most theoretical level, one may want
to ask about the general status of the existence and origin of
moral laws. Some take the position that moral laws are universal
and necessary: that they apply to all rational beings, with no
exceptions. In other words, moral laws have an a priori status,
and cannot be otherwise. According to this position, then, there
is a definite "right" and "wrong" regarding moral decisions.
Immanuel Kant is a supporter of this position. He establishes
the moral

law as an a

priori truth by grounding

it

in the

categories of thought (i.e. time, space, causality, etc.), which
are,

for him,

categories

of

given a

priori.

thought

are

If Kant

programmed,

is correct,

then the

by

into

nature,

the

consciousness of a rational being. They cannot be otherwise,
and, hence, the moral law is universal also.
Emile Durkheim agrees that morality
categories of thought,

and moreover,

is grounded

in the

that the moral law is a

universal law. However, he disagrees with Kant as to the origin
of the categories of thought. The categories of thought are not
programmed by nature, but rather, were constructed by primitive
societies in order to fit the particular needs of each society.

•

Durkheim owes much of his
wishes to retain a

ethical

theory to

Kant,

and

great deal of Kantianism in the theory.

However, he does so at great cost to his own theory. Instead of
reconciling the competing claims of rationalism and empiricism,
which is his ultimate goal in utilizing Kant, Durkheim ends up
with an ethical theory which is full of contradictions and which
is

basically

a

solely

empiricist

account

of

morality.

exploring both Kant's and Durkheim's ethical theories,

By

I will

demonstrate both the problems inherent in Durkheim's attempt to
reconcile

rationalism

retaining

a

and

universalistic

context of his theory.

empiricism,
account

of

and

his

morality,

failure
given

in
the

The result is an ethical theory with

relativistic implications.

KANT'S CONCEPTS OF FREE WILL AND RATIONALITY

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ANALYTIC AND SYNTHETIC A PRIORI
Kant makes the distinction between analytic and synthetic
a priori principles in order to establish certain metaphysical
principles such as:

"Every event has a

cause," as a

priori

priciplesi that is, principles which can be known by pure reason
(Korsgaard). In this way, Kant hopes to establish that we, as
rational beings,

can know such things as causation,

and thus

avoid Humean skepticism. Kant realizes that the principle "every
event has

a

cause"

is

not

an analytic

a

priori

principle,

because with an analytic a priori principle, the predicate will
be contained in the concept of the sUbject. In other words, an

•

analytic jUdgement can be thought of as a definition, which, if
denied,

would produce a contradiction.

principle,

on the other hand,

A synthetic a

must be demonstrated,

priori
for

its

denial is not a contradiction.
Now, Hume shows us that the principle of causation cannot
be derived from experience, thus, Kant will establish it as a
synthetic a
making

a

priori principle

distinction

(Kant,

1934).

the

noumenal

between

He does this by
world

and

the

phenomenal world. Instead of assuming that our beliefs about the
external world must correspond to the objects of the external
world, Kant posits that the objects must conform to our beliefs.
Thus, the world as we experience it, the phenomenal world,

is

not

it

necessarily

an

accurate

reflection

of

the

world

as

actually is, the noumenal world. In a sense, rational beings are
"programmed", by nature,

with what Kant calls "categories of

thought", which help us to make sense of a seemingly chaotic
world. One of these categories of thought is causality.
Just
synthetic

as
a

(Korsgaard).

the

metaphysical

priori
Kant

principle,

establishes

principle

of

causality

so

must

be

the

this

fact

by

appealing

distinction between hypothetical imperatives,

moral

is

a

law
to

a

and categorical

imperatives. A hypothetical imperative is an analytic jUdgement,
in the sense that when one wills one or other end,

one can

determine the means to that end merely by analyz ing the end
itself. In other words, the means are inherent in the end, and
are "indispensibly necessary" to obtain that end. The moral law,

however,

is

not

a

hypothetical

imperative,

but

rather

a

categorical imperative. Korsgaard explains:
Our duties hold for us regardless of what we want. A
moral rule does not say 'do this if you want that',
but simply 'do this'. It is expressed in a categorical
imperative. (p.208)
Because the means to morality cannot be found by analyzing
the end, the moral law cannot be an analytic principle, and so
must

be

established

synthetically.

In

this

way,

Kant

can

establish the moral law as a necessary principle which holds
universally. The universality and necessity of the moral law is
an indication of its a

pr~ori

status,

and, by inference,

its

grounding in the human reason.
THE IMPORTANCE OF FREE WILL TO KANT
Because the categ nr ica1 imperative is synthetic, Kant must
establish

the

link

between

rational will by means of a

morality

and

the

third "agent".

concept

of

a

He does this by

appealing to freedom of the will. He presents the challenge:
[I] f we can now discover the means to show that
freedom does in fact belong to the human will (and
thus to the will of all rational beings), then it will
have been proved not only that pure reason can be
practical, but also that it alone, and not the
empirically conditioned reason is unconditionally
practical. (1956, p.16)
Kant believes

that only

a

free

will

can

determine

an

unconditional practical law, which, to him, is the moral law: a
categorical imperative. Moreover,

the unconditional practical

law also implies freedom of the will. Korsgaard states:
Kant will ask 'how would a free will with nothing
constraining or guiding it determine its actions? and

•

he will argue that the answer is 'by the moral
law.' (p. 209)
However, Kant has a problem with establishing the freedom
of

a

will,

because

when

he

gives

the

synthetic

a

priori

principle "every event has a cause", he necessarily precludes
the possibility of there being a

first or spontaneous cause,

which is the only thing that a free will could be.
words,

given

that

our

wills

are

sUbject

to

the

In other
laws

of

causation, they must be determined, and hence, cannot be free,
for,

in

the

phenomenal world,

there

cannot

be

a

first,

or

spontanteous cause.
Kant solves this problem by pointing to another implication
of the distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal world.
Because the phenomenal world is temporal, spontaneous causation
is not possible. However, the noumenal world is not sUbject to
temporal laws, and there can be a spontaneous cause, even if it
is not knowable (Korsgaard). So, the mere possibility of there
being a first cause

is enough to establish that a will can be

free.
KANT'S MORAL LAW
Given that we understand Kant's concept of free will, we
can better define Kant's concept of rationality and how it ties
in with free will, and the moral law. As I stated earlier, the
phenomenal self is sUbject to the laws of causation, and thus a
human being, in this regard, is sUbject to his or her personal
whims and desires, which are not rational:

All practical principles which presuppose an object
(material) of the faculty of desire as the determining
ground of the will are without exception empirical and
can furnish no practical laws. (Kant, 1956, p. 19)
What Kant is implying here is that when one's principle, or
maxim,

is

principle
cannot

be

based
is

on

one's

desires,

the

necessarily undermined,

objective,

and

do

not

universality

since

personal

necessarily

hold

of

the

desires
for

all

rational beings. A principle which cannot be universal, cannot
be a law, and thus, cannot be a foundation for the morality of
a rational being.
The only way to make a sUbjective practical principle into
a

practical

universal

law

is

to

principle, and not the content

analyze

(Kant,

the

form

of

the

1956). This leads Kant

into the first formulation of the categorical imperative:
[A]ct that the maxim of your will could always hold at
the same time as a principle establishing universal
law. (Kant, 1956, p. 30)
This universal law is, to Kant, the moral law. By denying
that personal desires can be the determining ground of the will,
Kant

establishes

the

moral

law

as

a

law

based

on

pure

rationality or reason. It is important to note further that the
autonomy of the will is what establishes obligation to the moral
law, and that the duties which accompany the moral law cannot be
otherwise,

as

is

the

case

when

personal

desires

are

the

determining ground of the will.
SYNOPSIS OF KANT'S FORMULATION OF THE MORAL LAW

The moral law, according to Kant, is a necessary universal
law, which holds for all rational beings. The concepts of free

•

will and rationality are essential to Kant in order to establish
the moral law as a universal,

necessary truth.

Tied in with

these concepts is the idea that personal desires cannot be the
determining ground of the will,
acting rationally,
words,

morally,

in order for a

and with a

being to be

free will.

In other

these three concepts necessarily preclude the use of

personal desires as the determining ground of the will.

DURKREIM'S ETHICAL THEORY

KANT'S GENERAL IMPACT ON DURKHEIM
At
profound

this

point,

impact

that

I

feel

Kant's

it

necessary

ethical

to

theory

emphasize

had

the

overall

on

Durkheim's formulation of his ethical theory, and his quest to
establish sociology as a positive science on morality.

Kant

establishes the moral law as a law based on pure reason, thus
implying that this law is a necessary truth. Durkheim, however,
will turn the moral law into a variety of contingent truths.
From this point, he can then formulate a science for studying
these laws: the science of sociology.
Durkheim believes that these laws do not emerge out of the
individual ' $ will, transcending from the phenomenal world to the
noumenal world, as Kant believes. Rather, these laws emerge from
the

"collective conscience",

Whereas

Kant

believes

that

which
each

is,

in essence,

1ndividual,

rationally and with a will which is free,

who

society.
is

acting

will determine the

moral law as an individual, Durkheim believes that the moral law

•

is created at the time which society is created, and exists as
society does,

prior to the individual

(Durkheim,

1915).

The

foundation for this belief lies in Durkheim's concept of the
origin

of

the

categories

of

thought.

It

is

important

to

investigate this concept, for this is the main foundation for
Durkheim's divergence from Kant.
THE ORIGIN OF THE CATEGORIES OF THOUGHT
As I stated earlier, Kant believes that the categories of
thought are programmed into the consciousness of every rational
being. In other words, rational beings are given categories such
as time,

space,

categories

are

and causality
necessary

in

(among others)

order

for

a

by nature.

rational

The

being

to

organize his experiences.
Durkheim urges,

however,

that these categories are

not

given by nature, but rather, were formed by primitive societies
in order to fit the particular needs of each society.
Elementary

Forms

of

the

Religious

Life,

he

In The

investigates

primitive religions in order to support this belief.
Durkheim believes that religion is not as much an enricher
of the intellect as it is a contributor to the formation of the
intellect (1915). Given that this is true, all we need to do is
to investigate primitive religions in order to discover how the
contribution was made. Durkheim asserts that in every primitive
religion,
(1915).

categories of space,

He infers,

religion,

then,

time,

cause,

etc.,

are

found

that these categories are "born in

and of religion:

they are a

product of religious

thought" (1915, p. 22).
The

goal

that

Durkheim

has

in

mind,

in

arguing

that

categories of thought are socially constructed, is to reconcile
the conflicting claims of rationalism and empiricism. He states:
For some, the categories cannot be derived from
experience: they are logically prior to it and
condition it ... For this reason they are said to be a
priori.
Others,
however,
hold
that
they
are
constructed and made up of pieces and bits, and that
the individual is the artisan of this construction.
(1915, p. 26)
Durkheim then offers objections to both viewpoints.

The

rationalists, such as Kant, must posit certain entities such as
transcendancy of the mind and God,

in order to uphold their

theories. Durkheim argues that there is neither an explanation
nor is there a
Furthermore,

justification for these postulations

Durkheim

urges

that

"the

categories

of

(1915).
human

thought are never fixed in anyone definite form; they are made,
unmade,

and remade

incessantly;

they change with places and

times" (1915, p. 28).
Empiricism,
Durkheim.

The

also,

most

is

sUbject

compelling

to

serious

criticism

is

criticism

that

by

empiricism

deprives the categories of thought of all their characteristic
properties (1915). The categories under the empiricist doctrine
are

no

longer

universal

and

necessary,

as

they

should

be.

Durkheim's argument can be laid out as follows:
1. Categories impose themselves upon us.
2. Categories are independent of every particular sUbject.
3. Therefore, categories are not individual and subjective,
but rather, they are universal and necessary.

4. Empirical data
(i.e.
individual and sUbjective.

sensations)

are

essentially

5. Therefore, categories are not empirical data.

(1915)

A

line

rationalist

would

surely

agree

with

this

of

argument, but it is quite clear that Durkheim is unable to argue
this

point

consistentlY,

given

the

context

of

his

theory.

Durkheim is attributing universality and necessity to something
which he also argues is "made, unmade and remade" (1915, p. 28).
Unless Durkheim has some notion of universality and necessity
which he has not stipulated, and which differs greatly from the
common philosophical meanings of the two terms, he is plainly
contradicting himself. To say that something is universal and
necessary is to say that this thing holds true in all possible
worlds, and cannot be otherwise. The fact asserted by Durkheim
that categories are a product of collective thought

(i.e.

of

society), necesarily undermines the position that they are true
in all possible worlds. For example, one can easily conceive,
using Durkheim' s

scheme,

of two distinct primitive societies

coming to two completely different ideas of time and cause.
Suppose that one society constructs cause such that the event
occurring first temporally, causes the second event, whereas the
other society constructs cause such that the first event is
caused by the second event, in a temporal sequence. This thought
experiment is enough to show that Durkheim' s

concept of the

categories cannot include a concept of universality.
The conclusion which I have reached is that Durkheim ends
up sacrificing the rationalist aspect of his theory and

is

•

really supporting only an empiricist theory.
mind,

we must

consider a

further

Keeping this in

implication

of

Durkheim' s

theory with regard to his reformation of Kant's ethical theory.
Given that the categories of thought are formed by society and
can,

as

I

have

implication

is

shown,
that

vary

from

morality,

society

which

is

to

society,

grounded

the

in

the

categories, can also vary from society to society. Thus, Kant's
universalistic ethical theory becomes Durkheim's relativistic
ethical theory. Now,
paying

particular

if we closely examine Durkheim's theory,

attention

to

the

Kantian

concepts

which

Durkheim employs, we will be able to discover further problems
which

are

inherent

in

attempting

to

re-formulate

Kant's

universalistic ethical theory into a theory with relativistic
implications.
THE THREE ELEMENTS OF MORALITY
Morality,

according to Durkheim,

consists of three main

elements, these being: discipline, attachment to social groups,
and

autonomy.

The

first

element,

discipline,

involves

the

concepts of authority, and regularity of conduct. These concepts
somewhat parallel Kant's notion of duty and adherence to the
moral law, but there are some aspects of these concepts which I
do not believe Kant would accept.
By "regularity of conduct", Durkheim means:
[M]orality consists of a system of rules which
predetermine conduct. They state how one must act in
given situations; and to behave properly is to obey
conscientiously. (1961, p. 24)
So, the moral person will be consistent in his conduct, and

..

act according to these already established rules. According to
Durkheim, these rules already existed, apart from an individual
arriving

at

these

rules

through

pure

reason.

Kant's

main

mistake, in Durkheim's view, is in believing that the moral rule
resides entirely in the individual conscience (1961). Durkheim
proposes

instead

that

the

moral

rule

is

a

part

"collective conscience", just as the categories are.
words,

moral rules are a product of society,

of

the

In other

not individual

rationality.
Kant makes the further mistake of believing that morality
is expressed in a general,

abstract form,

which can then be

applied to individual circumstances. Durkheim takes issue with
this position, stating:
If we see morality as it is, we see that it consists
in an infinity of special rUles, fixed and specific,
which
order man's
conduct
in
those
different
situations in which he finds himself most frequently.
(1961, p. 25)
Thus, the fact that these rules already exist, and are at
the disposal of a person in any given situation, helps to ensure
the regularity of conduct.
Moreover,

these moral rules are invested with a certain

authority, whereby they are obeyed simply because they command.
Here

again,

we

can

see

the

influence

of

Kant,

and

formulation of a categorical imperative:
[I]t is a certain and incontestable fact that an act
is not moral, even when it is in substantial
aggreement with moral rules, if the consideration of
adverse consequences has determined it. Here ... for the
rule to be obeyed as it ought to be, it is necessary
for us to yield, not in order to avoid disagreeable

his

results or some moral or material punishment, but very
simply because we ought to,
regardless of the
consequences our conduct may have for us. One must
obey a moral precept out of respect for it and for
this reason alone (Durkheim, 1961, p. 30).
Durkheim wants to deny that utilitarian considerations can
play any role in a moral decision, for, in considering utility,
one necessarily undermines the morality of the action.

It is

essential to see how closely this parallels Kant's concept of
morality,

for it appears as if Durkheim directly borrows this

idea from Kant.
The question is,

then:

From where do these rules derive

their authority? Kant answers that a being acting rationally and
with free will,

will necessarily conclude that this or that

action is the moral action in a given situation, and that the
action cannot be otherwise. In other words, the moral rule is
given to us a priori, and, thus, is based upon pure reason. A
purely rational being could not even conceive of acting in any
other way.
Durkheim,

on the

other hand,

answers

appealing to our attachment to social
second element to morality.

Durkheim,

this

groups,

question by
which

is

the

in opposition to Kant,

states:
We cannot perform an act which is not in some way
meaningful to us simply because we have been commanded
to do so. It is psychologically impossible to pursue
an end to which we are indifferent ... Morality must,
then, be not only obligatory but also desirable and
desired.
This
desirability
is
the
second
characteristic of all moral acts. (1953, p. 45)
So, where does this desirability come from? Durkheim will

j

answer: from the social groups of which we are a part. In other
words,

we,

as

social

beings,

receive

positive

and

negative

sanctions for certain actions we perform, depending upon whether
these actions are considered moral or immoral by the collective
conscience. These sanctions are determined synthetically,

not

analytically, and thus:
It is not the intrinsic nature of my action that
produces the sanction which follows, but the fact that
the act violates the rule that forbids it. (Durkheim,
1953, p. 42)
The

Kantian

influence

is

undoubtedly

inherent

in

this

passage, but it is given a sociological bent, which results in
some contradictory notions in Durkheim's moral theory. First of
all, with regard to Durkheim's use of the texms "analytic" and
"synthetic",

it seems to me as if he doesn't fully undertand

Kant's use of these concepts. I think he loses sight of the fact
that the terms "synthetic" and "analytic" are used to describe
a

priori

principles;

that

is,

principles

founded

upon pure

reason. This is precisely why Kant denies that the moral law
comes from anywhere except for the individual who is acting
entirely from reason. This is also why personal desires cannot
playa role in moral decisions. Actions based upon desires, to
Kant, cannot be rational, because they are not based upon pure
reason, but rather, are based upon empirical grounds. As we can
see, Durkheim's problems here stem from the problems with his
theory on the origin of the categories

of thought.

Because

Durkheim cannot posit any a priori truths, given the context of
his theory, he cannot speak of morality in an a priori sense.

Durkheim's conclusion must be, then,

that moral laws are not

universal and necessary, and thus, they can vary from society to
society.
The second inconsistency in Durkheim's theory results when
Durkheim, after denying that utilitarian considerations can play
any role in a moral action, and can actually undermine moral
acts,

states that positive and negative sanctions play a key

role in instigating moral actions by the individual. What are
these sanctions if not utilitarian considerations? If Durkheim
is saying that our attachment to social groups is a factor in
acting morally, he is, in essence, saying that moral actions, at
least in part, rely on considerations of utility, on the part of
the individual actor. Again, Durkheim presents a Kantian concept
which he

is

not able to employ,

because of his

failure

to

reconcile rationalism and empiricism.
Putting these considerations aside for the moment, let us
turn to Durkheim1s third element of morality: autonomy. Durkheim
believes that the denial of individual autonomy is contrary to
morality;

thus,

the

autonomy

of

the

moral

agent

is

indispensible. Durkheim does not give any clear indication of
what

his

concept

of

autonomy

is,

except

to

say

that

an

individual is acting autonomously when he makes a moral decision
based upon reliable knowledge. The idea that Durkheim elaborates
upon is that as primitive societies move away from a mechanical
solidarity, where rules are obeyed simply by the authority with
which they are invested, to an organic solidarity, moral rules

are obeyed by individuals who have freely and rationally chosen
to obey these moral rules, based upon reliable knowledge of all
of the alternative avalable actions. Moreover, in the upheaval
of societies under revolution,

where is a person to look in

order to find the moral rule? Durkheim will answer:

in that

individual's own rational capacities and his or her ability to
act as an autonomous moral agent.
It appears that Durkheim is using Kant's concept of free
will in order to describe the autonomy of the individual,
least in an organic society.

at

However, it is essential that we

point out the implications of Durkheim's use of Kant's concept
of free will,

because I

believe that Durkheim doesn't

fully

understand what Kant is saying about what free will must be, if
it exists.
The essential thing to remember about Kant's concept of
free will is that a will is only free when it transcends from
the phenomenal world to the noumenal world.

In the phenomenal

world, the individual is subject to influence from desires and
personal

whims,

which

hinder

rationality.

Desires

are

empirically given, and, since pure reason (i.e. rationality) is
not empirical,

but rather,

given a priori,

desires cannot be

rational. So, desires hinder a will from acting rationally and,
thus, they hinder a will from acting freely. In essence, a will
that is free must be free from the phenomenal world.
Thus,

it

appears

that

Durkheim cannot

maintain

Kant's

concept of free will and still hold to his original ethical

theory, because he does incorporate personal desires into his
theory.

Now,

given that

Kant's

concept

of

free

will

is

an

accurate description of how free will must be conceptualized,
the logical

conclusion would be that,

given the

context of

Durkheim's ethical theory, he cannot maintain any concept of an
autonomous moral agent.
What reasons do we have for accepting Kant's concept of
free will as a true description of what free will would have to
be, if it existed? We have to show that it is not possible for
freedom to be anything other than a spontaneous, or first cause,
because if we believe otherwise, we will fall into the trap of
determinism, which necessarily precludes the possibility of free
will, contrary to Durkheim's opinion.
In order to show this, we must return to the factor which
initially motivates Kant to formulate his metaphysical theory.
Kant wants to establish that we can know of causality through an
a priori jUdgement. Hume had already established that causality
could not be determined through empiricism, so the only way to
save

all

scientific

endeavors

(inclUding

Durkheim's)

from

skepticism is to establish causality as a synthetic a priori
principle. The metaphysical principle of cause, which Kant wants
to rescue is: "Every event has a cause." We are thus faced with
choosing

one

of

two

contradictory

notions

about

causal i ty.

Either causality involves an infinite regress, where every cause
has its own cause, thus leaving us with a deterministic account
of the world, including the will; or, there must be some cause

by which all other events and causes come about. In order for
free

will

to

exist,

it

must

be

a

spontaneous

cause,

for

otherwise, it is determined by a different cause, and cannot be
free (simply by definition). So, Kant's concept of free will is
the only logically possible description of free will.
Thus,

we

can

see

that

Durkheim

makes

a

mistake

in

incorporating the element of autonomy into his ethical theory.
Given

that

Kant I s

free

will

was

a

necessary element

for

a

rational being, and that Durkheim has been unable to uphold a
theory which includes rationality,

it appears that Durkheim's

theory would fare better if he were to disregard free will. In
fact,

none of the Kantian concepts which Durkheim employs can

fit in to his theory without contradiction, and this fact leads
me

to

the

conclusion

that

Durkheim

should

not

have

even

attempted to utilize Kant in formulating his theory.

CONCLUSION

The argument that I have given is that there are serious
problems in Durkheim' s

attempt to combine Kant's concepts of

rationality, universality, and free will,

into a theory which

has empiricism as a foundation. The fact, asserted by Durkheim,
that the categories of thought are socially constructed, and not
given a priori, is the factor which leads to the failure of his
goal

to

reconcile

rationalism

and

empiricism.

Furthermore,

Durkheim ends up with an theory of ethical relativism,

rather

than a universalistic ethical theory. I do not believe that this

is a position which Durkheim wishes to support. There are many
indications that my belief is true,

but the most compelling

indication is that Durkheim wants to maintain the universality
and necessity of the categories of thought, which he believes
are the

foundation

for morality.

If the categories

are

not

universal, then neither is the moral law. As I stated earlier my
general feeling is that Durkheim might have fared better with
his theory had he disregarded the Kantian position on morality
and stuck to a solely empiricist account of ethics.

..
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